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Jones Act Seamen
FL EET DOCTRINE APP LIES TO
SH ORE-BASED RIGG ER
WORKING ON BARG E
Asserti ng the fleet docti ne, where p er
manent assi gnment to group of vessels
under common ownership can be
shown, al lows a ri gger worki ng on
floati ng p latforms to acqui re seaman
status i n a Jones Act acti on.
(Gizoni

v.

Southwest Marine inc., CA9,

56 F. 3d 1 138, 617195)

Byron Gizoni (Gizoni),
shore-based rigger and
rigging foreman, was in
jured when he stepped
into a hole on the deck of
Southwest Marine Inc.'s
(Southwest's)
floating
pontoon barge or floating platform during
repair of a U.S. Navy ship. The pontoon
was secured to a floating dry dock being
used to repair the ship's rudder.
Southwest, Gizoni's employer, was sued
under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. app. § 688,
on the claim that Gizoni was a seaman be
cause of his work aboard the barges and
watercraft owned by Southwest Marine.
Although the Jones Act provides an in
jured seaman a cause of action in negli
gence, it does not define seaman for pur
poses of the Act.
The district court found Gizoni to be a
harbor worker and therefore precluded
from suing under the Act, granting South
west summary judgment. The court of ap
peals reversed. The appeals court found
that the lower court had erred in its in
structions to the jury on the definition of
"seaman." In its remand for a new trial,
the appeals court held: (I) that the fleet
doctrine instruction should have been
given; (2) evidence that Gizoni had been
employed on a vessel in navigation was
not misleading; (3) the court's instruction
defining a vessel was erroneous; but that
(4) the "permanent connection" instruc
tion was correct.
Gizoni, the ninth circuit noted, had to
show, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that he was a "seaman." According to the
Bullis test, to prove one is a seaman, he
must be (I) employed on a vessel that is in
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navigation; (2) permanently connected
to that vessel; and (3) contributing to
the function of the mission of the ves
sel. Bullis v. Twentieth Century-Fox
Film Corp., 474 F.2d 392, 393 (9th
Cir. 1 973).
Gizoni claimed that the district court
had erred by not instructing the jury on
the fleet sea doctrine. The fleet doc
trine, created by the fifth circuit to
lower the requirement that a seaman
had to be permanently assigned to a
vessel, allows one to acquire seaman
status through permanent assignment
among multiple vessels under one
common ownership. Campo v. Elec
tro-Coal Transfer Corp., 970 F.2d 5 1 ,
52 (5th Cir. 1 992), cert. denied, 1 1 3
S.Ct. 1 26 1 , 1 22 L.Ed.2d 659 ( 1 993).
The appellate court determined that the
fleet doctrine was a reasonable exten
sion of Jones Act precedent. The court
considered evidence that Gizoni had
worked on a variety of barges for
Southwest. The fleet doctrine was also
applicable, ironically, because South
west, in its closing argument, focussed
on the fact that Gizoni could not prove
that he was "more or less permanently
attached" to a particular barge. There
fore, the district court clearly erred in
not giving the instruction.
The district court, argued Gizoni, also
erred by instructing the jury that Gi
zoni had to prove that the situs of the
accident occurred on a vessel in navi
gation. Under the Jones Act, a seaman
may recover for any injury that oc
curred in the course of employment.
0 'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge &
Dock Co., 3 1 8 U.S. 36, 63 S.Ct. 488,
87 L.Ed. 596 (1943). Thus, whether or
not the injury occurred on a vessel is
irrelevant. Yet, in contrast, the judge's
instruction to the jury implied Gizoni
had to establish that he was employed
on a vessel in navigation to recover.
Further, said Gizoni, the district court
clearly erred in instructing the jury
with the following: "If the transporta
tion function, if any, of the floating
platform was merely incidental to its
other functions, the floating platform
cannot be found to be a vessel. * * *
[T]o be a vessel, the purpose of the
floating platform must, to some rea
sonable degree, be the transportation
of passengers, cargo or equipment
from place to place across navigable

waters." Gizoni v. Southwest Marine Corp.,
56 F.3d 1 1 38, 1 1 42 (9th Cir. 1 995).
The court of appeals stated in previous de
cisions that unusual-looking craft, whose
purpose is not the transportation of persons
or things, can be considered vessels under
the Jones Act. Estate of Wenzel v. Seaward
Marine Services, 709 F.2d 1 326 (9th Cir.
1 983). Hence, the district court's instruc
tion regarding the transportation function
was also erroneous.
Finally, the plaintiff contended that, when
the district judge instructed the jury,
''[Gizoni] had to establish that he had a more
or less permanent connection with the vessel
*
*
* [,]" that this implied that he was re
quired to spend most of his time on that par
ticular barge. The appeals court did not find
this statement misleading. According to the
United States Supreme Court, "the key to
seaman status is employment-related con
nection to a vessel in navigation." McDer
mott Jnt'l v. Wilander, 498 U. S. 337, Il l
S.Ct. 807, 1 1 2 L.Ed.2d 866 ( 1 99 1 ).
The purpose of the connection requirement
is not intended to allow an individual who
works for an isolated period protection un
der the Jones Act, but to protect the seaman
who serves aboard one particular vessel for
a brief time. THOMAS 1. SCHOENBAUM, AD
MIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW § 6-9, at 263
(2d ed. 1 994).
Bryce A. Larrabee
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Collision
IYRR Y ACH TING REG ULATIONS
P REEMP T COLREG S
In yacht col li si on case, findi ngs of Inter
nati onal Jury p reemp t U. S. court's app li 
cati on of Arti cl es 12 & 13 of the Conven
ti on on Internati onal Regulati on for the
P reventi on
of
Colli si ons
at
Sea
( COLREG S).
(Juno SRL v. SIV Endeavour, CAl, 58
F.3d 1, 619195)

On October 3, 1 992, two vessels, the
and the Endeavour, were
racing in the La Nioulargue Regatta in and
around the Bay of St. Tropez. Although the
yachts were racing on separate courses, the
Charles Jourdan
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courses converged near the entrance to
St. Tropez Bay at a mark designated as
"A." As it approached mark "A," the
Charles Jourdan was sailing to lee
ward and believed it had the right of
way pursuant to International Yacht
Racing Rule (IYRR) 37. 1 : "[A] wind
ward yacht shall keep clear of a lee
ward yacht." The crew of the Endeav
our failed to make an attempt to change
course to windward until the last
minute and as a result the boom of the
Endeavour struck the backstay of the
smaller Charles Jourdan, causing sub
stantial damage.
An International Jury was convened,
as per the IYRR, to determine fault for
the collision. The International Jury,
applying the rules agreed to by the par
ticipants in the race, found the Endeav
our at fault.
In September 1 993, the owner of the
Charles Jourdan filed an action in ad
miralty, seeking compensation for the
damage sustained, and had the Endeav
our arrested. The Endeavour's owners
denied liability and counterclaimed for
losses due to alleged false arrest of the
vessel. The district court held that Ar
ticles 1 2 and 1 3 of the Convention on
International Regulation of Collisions
at Sea (COLREGS), 33 U.S.C. § 1 600
et seq., 33 C.F.R. § 80. 0 1 et seq., pre
empted application of the rules of a pri
vate yacht racing organization.
The district court ignored the findings
of the International Jury and con
cluded, under COLREGS Rule 1 3, 33
U.S.C. foil. § 1 602, that the Charles
Jourdan was an overtaking vessel re
quired to keep clear of the Endeavour.
Pursuant to the "Pennsylvania Rule,"
The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. ( 1 9 Wall.)
1 25, 22 L.Ed. 1 48 ( 1 873), failure to
abide by navigation rules creates a pre
sumption of negligence. Accordingly,
the Charles Jourdan was presumed to
be at fault. The Endeavour's failure to
take action to avoid the collision was
found to be significant and was appor
tioned 40% of fault. The court deter
mined that the physical damage to the
Charles Jourdan was valued at
$ 1 0,000, which was reduced to $4,000.
The first circuit, although noting that
the COLREGS were historically meant
to be the " international rules of the
road for maritime traffic," 58 F.3d at
4, also stated: "[N]othing in their hisFall1995
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tory, or in the public policy issues that led
to their enactment, indicates that they
were meant to regulate voluntary private
sports activity in which the participants
have waived their application and in
which no interference with nonparticipat
ing maritime traffic is implicated." !d.
The court based its conclusion not only on
the nature of the COLREGS and the pri
vate activity involved, but also on the
'·strong public policy in favor of the pri
vate settlement of disputes." 58 F.3d at 5.
The court traced through a number of ven
erable English decisions the premise that
"when one voluntarily enters a yacht race
for which published sailing instructions
set out the conditions of participation, a
private contract results between the partic
ipants." !d. Such a contract established
the conditions under which the partici
pants agreed to be bound. "The parties
agreed to the substantive rules for deter
mining fault, they agreed to the adjudicat
ing forum, and they were apprised of the
procedures. They appeared before [the In
ternational Jury], submitted to its jurisdic
tion, presented evidence and argument,
and thereafter were served with that
body's findings and final decision." 58
F.3d at 6.
The appeals court also took note of fed
eral policy favoring arbitration under § 2
of the Federal Arbitration Act, which
specifically defines "collisions" as arbitra
ble "maritime transactions." The two
yachts had agreed to be contractually
bound by the rules of the road as set forth
in the IYRR. The court, finding that the
IYRR procedures adequately addressed
due process concerns, reversed the district
court, commenting "It is hard to find fault
with such a process, particularly when it is
exactly what the participants agreed to."
58 F.3d at 7.
The first circuit, however, agreed with
the district court that it had valid jurisdic
tion over the damages issue, stating that
courts were the rightful forum for the liti
gation of damages, unless yacht racing au
thorities .provided for private means of
resolution. The court of appeals affirmed
the district court's finding that there were
$ 1 0,000 in damages resultant from the
collision. However, the first circuit held
that it was error for the lower court to have
mitigated the damages by assessing the
Charles Jourdan for comparative fault,
since the International Jury had preemp
tively found the Endeavour responsible

for the
collision,
thereupon
reinstating
the full
$ 1 0,000
award to the
Charles
Jourdan.
George M.
Chalos
Class of 1997
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Maritime Cargo
SUBSTITUTE VESSEL IS NOT A
COG SA UNREASONABL E
DEVIATION UNDER TERM S OF
BILL OF L ADING
A carri er's restowage of cargo onto a
vessel di fferent from that ori gi nally
named i n a contract of carri age i s not
an"unreasonable devi ati on" from the
contract i f a provi si on allows for ves
sel substi tuti on "to perform all or
part of the carri age. "
(Yang Machine Tool Co. v. Sea-Land
Service,

Inc.,

CA9,

58 F.3d

1350,

6130195)

The Yang Machine Tool Company
(Yang Machine) contracted with Sea
Land Service, Inc. (Sea-Land) to trans
port a large horizontal machining center
from China to California. Since the
cargo was too large to fit inside a stan
dard 40-foot enclosed container, it was
secured by steel bands in two parts on
open "flat racks," metal pallets without
side walls or tops, and placed on board
the Merchant Prince. The Merchant
Prince carried the cargo from China to
Yokohama, Japan, where it was off
loaded onto the Sea/and Patriot for
completion of the carriage to California.
During loading onto the Sea/and Pa
triot, a hoisting cable broke, resulting in
damage to the cargo.
The bill of lading identified the Mer
chant Prince as the carrying vessel.
Nothing in the bill indicated that the
cargo would be restowed aboard the
Sea/and Patriot. The bill contained a
XVIIR AC4

